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In New York suppression of evidence is only appropriate where it is mandated by
constitutional, statutory, or decisional authority, even if obtained by unethical or
unlawful means. The courts have been split on how to apply this standard to
evidence obtained in violation of HIPAA. In the case In re Miguel M., the New York
Court of Appeals addressed this question for the first time, finding that such
evidence should be suppressed. Because it is the first authoritative case in New
York addressing the evidentiary impact of a HIPAA violation, it is tempting to read
Miguel M. as creating a new evidentiary rule. The decision, however, was drafted
very narrowly in the context of a hearing to compel assisted outpatient treatment
under Kendra’s Law. Accordingly, Miguel M. should not be interpreted as a bar to
the admission of medical evidence obtained in violation of the HIPAA Privacy Rule
in other types of cases.
Rather, it suggests that courts consider the type of
proceeding, the type of medical evidence at issue, the identity of the parties, and the
reason for the introduction of the evidence when determining whether suppression is
appropriate. In this manner In re Miguel M. can be harmonized with existing
jurisprudence and be used to provide more equitable outcomes for litigants.

*
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INTRODUCTION
Since the implementation of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act Privacy Rule1 (“HIPAA Privacy Rule”) in 2000, attorneys and courts have been
scrambling to determine its impact on the admissibility of various types of medical
evidence. This is particularly the case where parties have obtained medical evidence
without a HIPAA authorization form which they seek to introduce in court. In New
York, most courts have avoided addressing such HIPAA violations by falling back
on the physician-patient privilege.2 Of the handful of New York’s lower courts
which have addressed the issue, most have followed the majority opinion of other
states, finding suppression for violations to be inappropriate.3
On May 19, 2011, New York’s highest court reached a different conclusion.4 In
the case In re Miguel M., after a party introduced medical records it had obtained
from hospitals without the patient’s authorization in a hearing to compel that patient
to receive assisted outpatient treatment, the Court of Appeals found those records
should have been suppressed. While the Court of Appeals found suppression
appropriate for the HIPAA violations in Miguel M., it provided scant analysis of the
issue and limited its decision to the facts of the case. Accordingly, Miguel M. should
not be construed as creating a bright line rule of evidence prohibiting all evidence
obtained without the requisite HIPAA authorization. It is, however, the first decision
by the Court of Appeals on the issue, and necessarily will be looked to as precedent.
This Article puts Miguel M. into the context of pre-existing caselaw and suggests
how it can be used as guidance in determining whether suppression is appropriate in
various types of cases.
Part I of this Article explains the requirements of the HIPAA Privacy Rule,
provides a background on suppression of evidence, and reviews the prior cases
which have addressed whether suppression is an appropriate remedy for HIPAA
violations. Part II describes the trial court, appellate court, and Court of Appeals
decisions in Miguel M. The Court of Appeals decision is then analyzed in Part III,
which also proposes how the holding of the case should be applied in civil, criminal,
and administrative hearings. Finally, this Article concludes that In re Miguel M.
should be narrowly applied and should not create a new rule of evidence dictating
that evidence obtained in violation of HIPAA be per se inadmissible in New York
courts.

1

Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg.
82462 (Dec. 28, 2000) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164).
2
See, e.g., Only Props. LLC v. Beaven, 2011 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2171 (Civ. Ct. 2011);
Hozle v. Healthcare Servs. Grp., 801 N.Y.S.2d 234 (Sup. Ct. 2005).
3

See, e.g., Valli v. Viviani, 801 N.Y.S.2d 243 (Sup. Ct. 2005); Matter of MacLeman, 808
N.Y.S.2d 918 (Sup. Ct. 2005).
4

In re Miguel M., 950 N.E.2d 107 (N.Y. 2011).
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I. PRIOR LAW:
A. The HIPAA Privacy Rule
In 1996, the legislature enacted the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA).5 HIPAA’s stated purpose is “to improve the Medicare
program under title XVIII of the Social Security Act, the Medicaid program under
title XIX of such Act, and the efficiency and effectiveness of the health care system,
by encouraging the development of a health information system through the
establishment of standards and requirements for the electronic transmission of
certain health information.”6 Indeed, one of the Parts added to the United States
Code under HIPAA is titled “Administrative Simplification.”7 Prior to HIPAA’s
enactment healthcare providers and insurance companies had to follow a complex
patchwork of privacy laws that differed from state to state.8 In order to accomplish
its goal of administrative simplification, the Secretary of the United States
Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) created “a national framework
for health privacy protection”9 which has become known as the HIPAA “Privacy
Rule.”10
Under the Privacy Rule, in most circumstances a “covered entity” may not
disclose “protected health information” without an “authorization.”11 Protected
5

Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110
U.S. Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of titles 18, 26, 29 and 42 of
the U.S. Code); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d-2(d), 1320d-3(a) (2011).
6
42 U.S.C. § 1320d note (2011) (Purpose); see also HIPAA pmbl., 110 U.S. Stat. at 1936
(“An Act . . . to improve portability and continuity of health insurance coverage in the group
and individual markets, to combat waste, fraud, and abuse in health insurance and health care
delivery, to promote the use of medical savings accounts, to improve access to long-term care
services and coverage, to simplify the administration of health insurance, and for other
purposes.”).
7

42 U.S.C. pt. C (2011).

8

Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg.
82462, 82463 (Dec. 28, 2000) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164) (“While virtually every
state has enacted one or more laws to safeguard privacy, these laws vary significantly from
state to state and typically apply to only part of the health care system. Many states have
adopted laws that protect the health information relating to certain health conditions such as
mental illness, communicable diseases, cancer, HIV/AIDS, and other stigmatized
conditions.”).
9

Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. at
82463; Citizens for Health v. Leavitt, 428 F.3d 167, 172 (3d Cir. 2005) (the regulations were
meant to “provide a federal baseline for privacy protection”); Kish v. Graham, 833 N.Y.S.2d
313, 357 (App. Div. 2007) (Pine, dissent), rev’d on other grounds sub nom Arons v.
Jutkowitz, 880 N.E.2d 831 (N.Y. 2007) (“The enactment of HIPAA in 1996 was spawned by
the economic efficiency of using electronic technology in transmitting medical records and the
concomitant need to formulate national standards to protect the confidentiality of those
records”).
10

45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164 (2012).

11
45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a)(1) (2012); see also Arons, 880 N.E.2d at 840-41; People v.
Bercume, 789 N.Y.S.2d 664, 668 (Sup. Ct. 2004).
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health information (“PHI”) includes information created or received by healthcare
providers relating to the physical or mental health of a patient or the provision of
healthcare to a patient, which could be used to identify the patient.12 A patient’s oral
statements to covered entities are included in this definition.13 Authorizations are not
required for the release of PHI when the information is requested through a court or
administrative order,14 nor are they required to respond to a subpoena, discovery
request, or other lawful process if the covered entity has received satisfactory
assurances that the party seeking disclosure has made reasonable efforts to ensure
that the patient has been given notice of the request or has made reasonable efforts to
secure a qualified protective order from a court or administrative tribunal.15 The
Privacy Rule contains additional exceptions to the authorization requirement,
including: disclosures required by law;16 disclosures to public health authorities for
preventing or controlling disease, injury or disability, and for the conduct of public
health surveillance, public health investigations, and public health interventions;17
disclosures to health oversight agencies for oversight activities authorized by law;18
and disclosures to avert a serious threat to health or safety to persons reasonably able
to prevent or lessen the threat.19
In general, the Privacy Rule expressly preempts any contrary provisions in state
law.20 However, state law is not preempted when the Secretary of Health has
determined that it is necessary to prevent fraud related to the provision of or payment
for health care; to ensure appropriate state regulation of insurance or health plans; for
the reporting on health care delivery and costs; or for purposes of serving a
compelling need related to public health or safety.21 In addition, state law is not
preempted where its privacy provisions are more stringent than those imposed by the
Privacy Rule.22 Nor is state law preempted where it establishes procedures for the
reporting of disease or injury for the conduct of public health surveillance,
investigation, or intervention.23
HIPAA expressly provides for remedies in the event of a violation. Remedies
include civil penalties ranging from $100 to $50,000, the amount depending on the
mental state of the violator (unknowing versus willful neglect) and whether the
12

45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2012).

13

Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. at
82539.
14

45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e)(1)(i) (2012).

15

45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e)(1)(ii).

16

45 C.F.R. § 164.512(a).

17

45 C.F.R. § 164.512(b)(1)(i).

18

45 C.F.R. § 164.512(d).

19

45 C.F.R. § 164.512(j).

20

45 C.F.R. § 160.203 (2012).

21

45 C.F.R. § 160.203(a)(1).

22

45 C.F.R. § 160.203(b); 42 U.S.C. §1320d-7(a)(2)(B) (2011).

23

45 C.F.R. § 160.203(c).
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violation has been corrected.24 Intentional violations of HIPAA can also lead to
criminal penalties of up to $250,000 in fines and up to ten years imprisonment.25 In
contrast to other federal legislation addressing privacy concerns,26 HIPAA does not
provide for the suppression of evidence obtained in violation of its provisions.
Following queries regarding the use of suppression as a remedy, the Secretary
responded: “We do not have the authority to mandate that courts apply or not apply
the exclusionary rule to evidence obtained in violation of the regulation. This issue is
in the purview of the courts.”27
B. Suppression
In New York, “absent some constitutional, statutory, or decisional authority
mandating the suppression of otherwise valid evidence, such evidence will be
admissible”28 even if procured by “unethical or unlawful means.”29 Courts have
applied this rule in several types of proceedings. For example, in Radder v. CSX
Transportation, Inc., a personal injury action, the Fourth Department of New York’s

24

42 U.S.C. § 1320d-5(a)(1)(A)-(C) (2011).

25

42 U.S.C. §1320d-6(b) (2011).

26

See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2710(d) (2011) (prohibiting the use of evidence obtained in
violation of the Video Privacy Protection Act "in any trial, hearing, arbitration, or other
proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, department, officer, agency, regulatory body,
legislative committee, or other authority of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision
of a State"); 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (2011) (prohibiting the use of evidence obtained in violation of
the Wiretap Act “in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, grand jury,
department, officer, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of the
United States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof.”).
27
Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg.
82462, 82596 (Dec. 28, 2000); see also 65 Fed. Reg. at 82679 (“[U]nder the HIPAA statutory
authority, we cannot impose sanctions on law enforcement officials or require suppression of
evidence. We must therefore rely on rules that regulate disclosure of protected health
information by covered entities in the first instance.”).
28

Radder v. CSX Transp., Inc., 893 N.Y.S.2d 725, 726 (App. Div. 2009) (quoting
Heimanson v. Farkas, 738 N.Y.S.2d 894, 894 (App. Div. 2002)); see also Cohens v. Hess, 705
N.E.2d. 1202, 1204 (N.Y. 1998) (“all facts having rational probative value are admissible,
unless some specific rule forbids.” (quoting Wigmore, Evidence §10, at 667(Tillers rev.
1983))).
29
Stagg v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 556 N.Y.S.2d 779, 780 (App. Div. 1990); see
also People v. Greene, 879 N.E.2d 1280, 1281 (N.Y. 2007) (“Our decisions make clear that a
violation of a statute does not, without more, justify suppressing the evidence to which that
violation leads”); People v. Wilder, 712 N.E.2d 652, 654 (N.Y. 1999) (“all evidence that has
any tendency in reason to prove the existence of any material fact, i.e., it makes the
determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence, is
relevant and admissible unless its admission would violate some exclusionary rule.”);
Mosallem v. Berenson, 905 N.Y.S.2d 575, 581 (App. Div. 2010) (“in the absence of some
constitutional, statutory, or decisional authority, such evidence is admissible in a civil
proceeding even if obtained by wrongful means.”); People v. Liggan, 878 N.Y.S.2d 735, 737
(App. Div. 2009) (“The exclusionary rule applies to a violation of a statute only where the
purpose of the statute is to effectuate a constitutionally protected right.”).
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Appellate Division30 declined to suppress evidence which had been obtained by
virtue of a violation of former DR 7-104 of New York’s Code of Professional
Responsibility (which prohibited lawyers from communicating with an individual on
the subject of the representation with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by a
lawyer), noting “[h]ere, there is no constitutional, statutory or case law authority
mandating the suppression of Pauley's otherwise valid testimony. . . .”31 Similarly,
in Matter of Quadon H., a juvenile delinquency proceeding, where the defendant’s
fingerprints were matched to fingerprints in the police database, which should have
been destroyed pursuant to Family Court Act § 354.1, the Second Department of
New York’s Appellate Division declined to suppress the defendant’s inculpatory
statements that would not have been obtained but for the fingerprint match.32 In so
finding, the court reasoned that “the right conferred on the respondent pursuant to
Family Court Act § 354.1 to have his fingerprints destroyed does not implicate
fundamental constitutional interests or considerations. Hence, the violation of
Family Court Act § 354.1, ‘does not, without, more, justify suppressing of evidence
to which that violation leads.’”33 The New York Court of Appeals used the same
reasoning in Charles Q. v. Constantine, where the records from an officer’s criminal
proceeding, which should have been sealed pursuant to section 160.50 of the New
York Criminal Procedure Law (“CPL”), were erroneously used in the officer’s
disciplinary proceeding.34 The Court noted a prior decision in which it found that
violations of CPL § 160.50 do not implicate constitutional considerations and would
not require suppression in a criminal proceeding.35 Thus, the Court reasoned,
“[h]aving concluded that evidence obtained in violation of a CPL 160.50 sealing
order need not be suppressed in a criminal proceeding, we discern no basis for
excluding from a disciplinary hearing evidence obtained through an erroneous
unsealing order.”36
In terms of HIPAA violations, as previously mentioned HIPAA itself provides no
authority for suppression,37 and the only statute that can serve as a basis for
suppression is limited to specific situations in civil trials. Since 2003, section
3122(a) of New York’s Civil Procedure Law and Rules (“CPLR”) has required
written HIPAA authorizations to accompany subpoenas duces tecum for patients’

30
In New York, appeals from trial courts (officially called Supreme Courts), go to the
Appellate Division, which is divided into four departments based on location, appeals from
the appellate division go to the New York Court of Appeals (which is the highest court in New
York).
31

Radder v. CSX Transp., Inc., 893 N.Y.S.2d 725, 726 (App. Div. 2009); see also
Heimanson v. Farkas, 738 N.Y.S.2d 894, 894 (App. Div. 2002) (finding evidence admissible
even though obtained because of a DR 7-104 violation).
32

In re Quadon H., 866 N.Y.S.2d 693 (App. Div. 2008).

33

Id. at 695 (quoting People v. Greene, 879 N.E.2d 1280, 1281 (N.Y. 2007).

34

In re Charles Q. v. Constantine, 650 N.E.2d 839 (N.Y. 1995).

35

Id. at 840 (citing People v. Patterson, 587 N.E.2d 255 (N.Y. 1991)).

36

Id. at 840.

37

See discussion supra Part I.A.
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medical records.38 This provision in CPLR § 3122 ensures that the procurement of
medical records via subpoenas complies with HIPAA’s requirement that the patient
be on notice.39 Under section 3103(c) of the CPLR, “if any disclosure under [Article
31 of the CPLR] has been improperly or irregularly obtained so that a substantial
right of a party is prejudiced” the court may issue a suppression order.40 Because the
requirement for HIPAA authorizations is in Article 31 of the CPLR, section 3103(c)
provides statutory authority for a court to suppress information obtained via
subpoena without the requisite notice to patients when substantial rights are
prejudiced.
The term “substantial right” as used in CPLR 3103(c) is more inclusive than
constitutional rights.41 Thus, New York courts have found that violations of the
CPLR affecting such rights as privacy in financial and medical records,42 and the
attorney-client privilege,43 are cause for suppression. Such was also the result in
Muzio v. Napolitano, where the Second Department issued a protective order
pursuant to CPLR 3103(c) precluding the defendant from calling petitioner’s treating
physician because the defendant had conducted an interview of the physician without
a valid HIPAA authorization.44
Suppression under CPLR 3103(c) is discretionary, however, and even where
information is obtained by improper means, suppression is not warranted where the
party would be entitled to discovery of the information improperly obtained.45 For
example, in the case In re Estate of Kochovos, the First Department affirmed the
surrogate court’s denial of suppression when the contestants issued subpoenas duces
tecum on various banks and two doctors commanding attendance at depositions and
the production of certain records, without notifying the proponent.46 The court noted
that though it disapproved of the contestants’ tactics, “[n]one of the material
obtained was privileged, and there is no showing that counsel would not have been
entitled to obtain the documents at issue in the normal course of discovery, properly
38
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3122 (Consol.2012) (“A medical provider served with a subpoena duces
tecum requesting the production of a patient's medical records pursuant to this rule need not
respond or object to the subpoena if the subpoena is not accompanied by a written
authorization by the patient. Any subpoena served upon a medical provider requesting the
medical records of a patient shall state in conspicuous bold-faced type that the records shall
not be provided unless the subpoena is accompanied by a written authorization by the
patient.”).
39

See 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e)(1)(ii) (2012).

40

N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3103(c) (Consol. 2012).

41

Henriques v. Boitano, 1999 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 693, at *4-5 (Civ. Ct. Oct. 27, 1999),
aff’d, 800 N.Y.S.2d 347 (App. Term 2000).
42

Id.

43

Parnes v. Parnes, 915 N.Y.S.2d 345 (App. Div. 2011); Surgical Design Corp. v. Correa,
799 N.Y.S.2d 584 (App. Div. 2005).
44

Muzio v. Napolitano, 919 N.Y.S.2d 64, 65-66 (App. Div. 2011).

45

Robinson v. Robinson, 764 N.Y.S.2d 93, 94 (App. Div. 2003); Gutierrez v. Dudock,
715 N.Y.S.2d 333, (App. Div. 2000); DiMarco v. Sparks, 624 N.Y.S.2d 692, 693 (App. Div.
1995).
46

In re Estate of Kochovos, 528 N.Y.S.2d 37 (App. Div. 1988).
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conducted.”47 Accordingly, it found the surrogate court had properly denied
suppression.48 Likewise, in Santiago v. N.D. Enterprises, Inc., though it was
undisputed that the HIPAA forms the defendant used to obtain the plaintiff’s medical
records had been altered, the Appellate Term found that suppression of the records
was not appropriate under CPLR 3103 because there was no prejudice to the plaintiff
who had waived the physician-patient privilege.49
Whether it is appropriate to suppress HIPAA violations under constitutional
authority is more problematic as it is less clear whether the constitutional right to
privacy is implicated by violations of the Privacy Rule. As noted by the United
States Supreme Court, “[t]he Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of
privacy,” however “a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or
zones of privacy,” is implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal
liberty.50 This right to privacy “is not a ‘bright line’ concept”51 and the United States
Supreme Court has traditionally only found it to encompass matters relating to
marriage,52 procreation,53 contraception,54 family relationships,55 and child rearing
and education.56 The Court has avoided ruling on whether it extends to
confidentiality in health information.57 Accordingly, court decisions on the issue are
47

Id. at 38.

48

Id.

49

Santiago v. N.D. Enter., Inc., 864 N.Y.S.2d 667 (App. Term 2008).

50

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).

51
Ritterband v. Axelrod, 562 N.Y.S.2d 605, 611 (Sup. Ct. 1990) (citing Crosby v. State
Workers’ Comp. Bd., 442 N.E.2d 1191, 1193-94 (N.Y. 1982)).
52

See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down a ban on interracial
marriage).
53

See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535
(1942) (invalidating a state law which provided for compulsory sterilization after a third
conviction for a felony involving moral turpitude)
54

See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (overturning a conviction under a law
banning the distribution of contraceptives); Griswald v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
(striking down a ban on the use of contraceptives)
55

See, e.g., Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (invalidating a zoning
ordinance which limited occupancy of residences to members of a “family” and provided a
narrow definition of “family”).
56
See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (striking down a law that prohibited
the teaching of foreign language to young children); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925) (striking down a law requiring children to attend public schools). See also Planned
Parenthood of Southern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693,
713 (1976); Doe v. Axelrod, 136 A.D2d 410, 437 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988); In re Eichner, 426
N.Y.S.2d 517, 538 (App. Div. 1980).
57
Mark A. Rothstein, Currents in Contemporary Bioethics: Constitutional Right to
Informational Health Privacy in Critical Condition, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 280, 283 (2011);
NASA v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 751 (2011) (“assum[ing], without deciding, that the
Constitution protects a privacy right” in medical information); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589,
605-06 (1977) (stating that the state’s ability to collect medical information typically is
accompanied by a statutory or regulatory duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures which
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less than clear. For example, in Doe v. City of New York,58 the Second Circuit found
that the plaintiff had a constitutional right to privacy in his HIV status. Likewise, in
Powell v. Schriver, the court held that postoperative transsexuals “possess a
constitutional right to maintain medical confidentiality” about their status.59 And in
O’Connor v. Pierson 60 the court found that a school employee had “a protected
privacy right in the medical records” relating to his substance-abuse treatment. In
contrast, however, the Second Circuit has recently found that a woman’s
fibromyalgia status is not covered by any constitutional right to privacy.61 In so
finding, the court explained that “the interest in the privacy of medical information
will vary with the condition.”62 It clarified that the outcome in O’Connor “does not
suggest that a third party’s disclosure of one particular medical condition in every
case violates the right to privacy. Indeed, the ‘privacy of certain medical conditions’
has been ‘constitutionalized’ only ‘within narrow parameters.’”63 Noting that privacy
protections should only attach to serious medical conditions carrying a social stigma,
the court found that constitutional rights to privacy in medical conditions should be
determined “on a case-by-case basis.”64
Even assuming there is a constitutional right to privacy in medical records,
however, New York courts have noted that “[a] statute may be based on privacy
considerations and yet not implicate the constitutional right to privacy.”65 To
determine whether the constitutional right is implicated, New York courts have
looked to the purpose and history behind a statute.66 For instance, the Court of
Appeals has found that the physician-patient privilege serves three core policy
objectives: (1) “to maximize unfettered patient communication with medical
professionals, so that any potential embarrassment arising from public disclosure
will not ‘deter people from seeking medical help and securing adequate diagnosis
and treatment,’” (2) to encourage “medical professionals to be candid in recording
confidential information in patient medical records,” and (3) to protect “patients'
reasonable privacy expectations against disclosure of sensitive personal
information.”67 In People v. Greene, the First Department found that there was
“arguably has its roots in the Constitution,” but finding it need not determine that issue on the
facts before it).
58

Doe v. City of New York, 15 F.3d 264, 267 (2d Cir. 1994).

59

Powell v. Schriver, 175 F.3d 107, 112 (2d Cir. 1999).

60

O’Connor v. Pierson, 426 F.3d 187, 201 (2d Cir. 2005).

61

Matson v. Board of Educ., 631 F.3d 57, 69 (2d Cir. 2011).

62

Id. at 64 (citing Powell, 175 F.3d at 111).

63

Id. at 66 (quoting Powell, 175 F.3d at 112.).

64

Id. at 66-67.

65

People v. Greene, 824 N.Y.S.2d 48, 55 (App. Div. 2006), aff’d, 879 N.E.2d 1280 (N.Y.
2007).
66

N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp. v. Morgenthau (In re Grand Jury Investigation), 779
N.E.2d 173 (N.Y. 2002); People v. Greene, 879 N.E.2d 1280 (N.Y. 2007); People v.
Patterson, 587 N.E.2d 255, 257, (N.Y. 1991).
67

In re Grand Jury Investigation, 779 N.E.2d at 175; see also Camperlengo v. Blum, 436
N.E.2d 1299, 1300 (N.Y. 1982); Dillenbeck v. Hess, 536 N.E.2d 1126, 113-31 (N.Y. 1989).
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“nothing in these core objectives ‘indicating a legislative intent to confer a
constitutionally derived substantial right’” and accordingly ruled that information
about a defendant divulged by a hospital administrator was admissible even if it
violated the physician-patient privilege.68 The Court of Appeals affirmed this
analysis, stating “[t]here is no constitutional right to privacy in physician-patient
communications.”69 Similarly, in an earlier decision addressing the admissibility of
a surgeon’s disclosure of drugs discovered during surgery, the First Department
stated “with respect to this latter claim of infringement of constitutional rights, we
note that the privilege embodied in CPLR 4504(a) is not of constitutional
dimension.”70 The Fourth Department has also stated that “[t]he physician-patient
privilege is based on statute, not the State or Federal Constitution,” and accordingly
found that suppression of evidence to which the violation had led was unnecessary.71
Like the physician-patient privilege, the primary purpose behind the HIPAA
Privacy Rule was not to protect individuals’ constitutional rights to privacy. Rather,
the goal was administrative simplification.72 To reach this goal, the Secretary
designed the Privacy Rule:
(1) To protect and enhance the rights of consumers by providing them
access to their health information and controlling the inappropriate use of
that information;
(2) to improve the quality of health care in the U.S. by restoring trust in
the health care system among consumers, health care professionals, and
the multitude of organizations and individuals committed to the delivery
of care; and
(3) to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of health care delivery by
creating a national framework for health privacy protection that builds on
efforts by states, health systems, and individual organizations and
individuals.73
Thus, like the physician-patient privilege, the Privacy Rule is not primarily aimed
at the Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition of government interference with an
individual’s liberty. And like violations of the physician-patient privilege, the
constitutional right to privacy is not necessarily implicated by violations of the
Privacy Rule.
68

Greene, 824 N.Y.S.2d at 55 (quoting Patterson, 587 N.E.2d at 257).

69

Greene, 879 N.E.2d at 1281; see also People v. Al-Kanani, 307 N.E.2d 43, 44 n.1 (N.Y.
1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 916 (1974) (noting that the physician-patient privilege is “not
one of constitutional magnitude.”).
70

People v. Figueroa, 568 N.Y.S.2d 957, 958 (App. Div. 1991).

71

People v. Bryant, 900 N.Y.S.2d 810, 811 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting Greene, 879
N.E.2d at 1281); see also People v. Sergio, 864 N.Y.S.2d 264, 278-79 (Sup. Ct. 2008) (“The
principal purpose of the [physician-patient] privilege relates to facilitating full disclosure by
the patient, not protection of the patient's constitutional privacy rights or any other
constitutional right.”).
72

See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg.
82462, 82463 (Dec. 28, 2000).
73

Id.
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C. Prior Cases Addressing the Applicability of Suppression to HIPAA Violations
Since the passage of the Privacy Rule, New York’s supreme courts have had to
address the issue of suppression as it relates to medical information obtained without
the requisite HIPAA authorization. One of the first attempts was made by the
Richmond County Supreme Court in Keshecki v. St. Vincent’s Medical Center.74
Keshecki was a medical malpractice case in which the defense counsel discussed the
plaintiff’s medical condition with her treating physician without first obtaining a
HIPAA authorization form. In addressing the HIPAA violation, the court reasoned
that: “HIPAA protects that privacy of the plaintiff, and this court must protect that
right. The only adequate remedy is to preclude any evidence obtained contrary to
those safeguards.”75 The court went on to detail what must be included in a HIPAA
authorization in order for an attorney to have private discussions with a party’s
physician.76 Likewise, in Matter of Derek, Broome County’s Surrogate Court
precluded treating physicians’ affirmations from a guardianship proceeding where
they failed to observe the physician-patient privilege as well as HIPAA’s Privacy
Rule.77
Other New York courts have criticized Richmond County’s approach and
reached the opposite conclusion. For example in Valli v. Viviani, the Suffolk County
Supreme Court stated:
what the decision in Keshecki v. St. Vincent’s Medical Center has done is
place the onus to enforce HIPAA upon the trial justice. Should a doctor’s
testimony be precluded at trial because he or she granted an interview
pursuant to a trial subpoena without obtaining the assurances required by
HIPAA?... Certainly the conditions set forth in Keshecki are a judicial
attempt to preemptively set forth what one court deems compliance with
the federal regulation… this court declines to follow the holding…78
Likewise, the Niagara County Supreme Court stated that “. . . the Keshecki court
also imposed a HIPAA based remedy by granting plaintiff’s motion to preclude the
testimony of two treating physicians. This Court finds nothing under New York law
or HIPAA bestowing such rights or authorizing such a remedy.”79 Similarly, the
New York County Supreme Court,80 the Kings County Family Court,81 the
74

Keshecki v. St. Vincent’s Med. Ctr., 785 N.Y.S.2d 300 (Sup. Ct. 2004).

75

Id. at 305.

76

Id. at 304.

77

Matter of Derek, 821 N.Y.S.2d 387, 390 (Sur. Ct. 2006).

78

Valli v. Viviani, 801 N.Y.S.2d 243, 243 (Sup. Ct. 2005).

79

Holzle v. Healthcare Servs. Grp., Inc., 801 N.Y.S.2d 234, 234 (Sup. Ct. 2005).

80

Perry v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr., No. 122908/01, slip op at 2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty.
Feb. 16, 2005); see also Crystal v. Constantino, No. 0106552/2003, slip op at 6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
N.Y. Cnty. Jan. 27 2005) (“Although defense counsel acknowledged non-compliance with
HIPAA, the Court is not satisfied that preclusion is the most fair remedy.”).
81
Matter of B. Children, 886 N.Y.S.2d 70 (Fam. Ct. 2009) (“While HIPAA regulates
disclosure of medical information by medical providers and establishes a uniform reporting
system for health facilities, its privacy provisions are procedural in nature and do not create
any new privileges.”)
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Westchester County Surrogate Court,82 and the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York83 have each concluded that HIPAA does not create any
new physician–patient privilege.
The decisions of New York’s lower courts mimic those of federal courts and the
majority of other states’ courts which have addressed the issue. In refusing to
suppress improperly obtained medical evidence, the most common analysis points to
the fact that HIPAA provides its own remedies and suppression is not among them.
For example, the Idaho Supreme Court found “suppression of the evidence is not the
proper remedy for a HIPAA violation . . . HIPAA expressly provides for monetary
fines in the event of a violation. Thus, the proper remedy for a HIPAA violation is a
monetary fine, consistent with the express provisions of the statute.”84 Likewise the
Florida District Court of Appeals stated, “[e]ven where evidence is disclosed by a
covered entity in violation of HIPAA standards, suppression of the records is not
provided for by HIPAA and is thus not a proper remedy.”85 Similar statements have
been made by the Supreme Court of Georgia,86 the Wisconsin Court of Appeals,87
the Indiana Court of Appeals,88 the Kansas Court of Appeals,89 the Illinois Appeals
Court,90 the Court of Appeals of Louisiana,91 the Michigan Court of Appeals,92 the
82

In re Estate of MacLeman, 808 N.Y.S.2d 918 (Sup. Ct. 2005) (Declining to follow
Keshecki, noting that “… HIPAA did not create any substantive rights or remedies in the
courts”).
83

EEOC v. Boston Mkt. Corp., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27338, at *8 n.3 (E.D.N.Y. Dec.
16, 2004) (“The court notes that HIPAA’s limitations on the ways in which health information
may be released is separate and apart from any claim of privilege that the plaintiff may have
had or waived.”).
84

State v. Mubita, 188 P.3d 867, 878-79 (Idaho 2008) (internal citations omitted).

85

State v. Carter, 23 So. 3d 798, 801 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009).

86

Moreland v. Austin, 670 S.E.2d 68, 72 (Ga. 2008) (“The remedies for HIPAA violations
are set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-5. That section merely authorizes the Secretary to impose a
fine not to exceed $100 for each violation. It does not authorize a remedy or penalty in the
context of a civil lawsuit.”).
87

State v. Straehler, 2008 WI App 14, ¶ 13, 745 N.W.2d 431, 436 (Ct. App. 2007)
(“HIPAA does not provide for suppression of the evidence as a remedy for a HIPAA
violation. Suppression is warranted only when evidence has been obtained in violation of a
defendant’s constitutional rights or if a statute specifically provides for suppression as a
remedy.”).
88
State v. Eichhorst, 879 N.E.2d 1144, 1154-55 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (“HIPAA provides
for civil and criminal penalties for improper disclosures of medical information … [the
defendant] cites no authority for the proposition that evidence given in violation of HIPAA
should be suppressed or excluded in a criminal setting. HIPAA does not contain such a
remedy.”)
89

State v. Yenzer, 195 P.3d 271 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008) (concluding that regardless of
whether a HIPAA violation occurred, the defendant was not entitled to suppression because
HIPAA did not provide for it as a remedy).
90

People v. Bauer, 931 N.E.2d 1283, 1292 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (“Even if the grand jury
subpoena had been insufficient pursuant to HIPAA’s law enforcement exception… the
defendant fails to cite any authority which compels that medical information so obtained must
be suppressed, and HIPAA does not contain such a remedy.”).
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United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,93 the United States District
Court of Maryland,94 and the United States District Courts of Eastern and Southern
California.95
II. IN RE MIGUEL M.
A. Background
96

In the case In re Miguel M., the New York Court of Appeals had its first
opportunity to address the admissibility of medical evidence obtained in violation of
the HIPAA Privacy Rule. The case arose out of a Queens County hearing held
pursuant to section 9.60 of the Mental Hygiene Law (“Kendra’s Law”) to order
Assisted Outpatient Treatment (“AOT”) for Miguel M.97 Kendra’s Law is named for
Kendra Webdale, who was killed when a mentally ill man, Andrew Goldstein,
pushed her off a subway platform in January 1999. 98 In the two years prior to the
fatal attack, Mr. Goldstein had attacked thirteen other individuals, most of whom
were hospital workers or patients.99 Despite Mr. Goldstein’s history of violent
behavior and his requests for treatment, he had been released by the state mental

91
State v. Downs, 04-2402 (La. App. 1st Cir. 09/23/05); 923 So. 2d 726, 731(2005)
(noting that if the complaint is that HIPAA was violated, the complainant “should file a
complaint against the covered entity that disclosed the information.”).
92

Belote v. Strange, 2005 Mich. App. LEXIS 2642, at *16-17 (Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2005)
(The remedies for failure to comply with the requirements and standards of HIPAA are found
under 42 USC 1320d-5. However, these remedies do not address how courts [sic] should treat
health information obtained in violation of its provisions. . . . As with every discovery
violation, whether and in what manner the violation should be sanctioned is a matter
committed to the sound discretion of the court.).
93

United States v. Streich, 560 F.3d 926, 935 (9th Cir. 2009) (“HIPAA does not provide
any private right of action, much less a suppression remedy.”) (Kleinfeld, J., concurring).
94
United States v. Elliott, 676 F. Supp. 2d 431, 438 (D. Md. 2009) (“Neither Sutherland
nor Kreshecki compel a finding that medical information obtained through the use of an
improper subpoena under HIPAA’s law enforcement exception should be prohibited from use
at trial… HIPAA itself does not provides that medical information so obtained must be
suppressed. The Court is unaware of any authority which compels the suppression of the
records at trial.”); Law v. Zukerman, 307 F. Supp. 2d 705, 712 (D. Md. 2004) (“Since HIPAA
does not include any reference to how a court should treat such a violation [of HIPAA] during
discovery or at trial, the type of remedy to be applied is within the discretion of the Court
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37.”).
95

Frye v. Ayers, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124339, at *8 (E.D. Cal. May 11, 2009)
(“HIPAA does not provide for exclusion of evidence as a remedy for its violation.”);
Crenshaw v. MONY Life Insurance Co., 318 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1029-30 (S.D. Cal. 2004)
(noting that HIPAA has its own sanctions).
96

In re Miguel M., 950 N.E.2d 107 (N.Y. 2011).

97

In re Miguel M., 882 N.Y.S.2d 698, 699 (App. Div. 2009).

98

Miguel M., 950 N.E.2d at 110; In re K.L, 806 N.E.2d 480, 482 (N.Y. 2004).

99
David Rohde, Jury Still Considering Subway Killing Verdict, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30,
1999, at B2.
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health system.100 At the time he pushed Ms. Webdale, he had stopped taking his
anti-psychotic medication.101 Following the public outcry after Ms. Webdale’s
death,102 the New York Legislature enacted Kendra’s Law, which was “designed to
protect the public and individuals living with mental illness by ensuring potentially
dangerous mentally ill outpatients are safely and effectively treated.”103 Under
Kendra’s Law, an individual may be ordered to receive outpatient treatment if he or
she meets the following criteria: the person is at least 18 years old; suffering from a
mental illness; unlikely to survive in a community safely without supervision; has a
history of failing to comply with treatment, which caused hospitalization at least
twice within 36-months of the petition or caused one or more acts of serious violent
behavior; as a result of the individual’s mental illness he or she is unlikely to
voluntarily participate in outpatient treatment; assisted outpatient treatment is
necessary to prevent a relapse or deterioration which would likely result in harm to
the person or others; and assisted outpatient treatment is likely to benefit the
person.104 A petition for an order authorizing AOT may be filed by anyone over 18
years old who is living with the subject individual, or the parent spouse, sibling, or
child of the subject individual.105 It may also be filed by specified professionals
involved in treating the subject individual, as well as the director of community
services, social services officials, or an individual’s parole officer.106 The petition
must identify facts supporting the petitioner’s assertion that the individual meets the
criteria for AOT.107
B. Trial Court Ruling
The petition in Miguel M. was filed by Charles Barron, M.D., the Director of the
Department of Psychiatry at Elmhurst Hospital Center (“Elmhurst”), who was
seeking to require Miguel M. to receive AOT.108 In support of the petition, Dr.
Barron presented the testimony of Dr. Garza, the Director of AOT at Elmhurst.109
100
Anemona Hartocollos, Nearly 8 Years Later, Guilty Plea in Subway Killing, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 11, 2006, at B1; David Rohde, Subway Killer Apologizes at Sentencing, N.Y.
TIMES, May 5, 2000, at B1.
101

Anemona Hartocollis, Subway Victim’s Mother Speaks at Killer’s Sentencing, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 3, 2006, at B3.
102
Kathryn A. Worthington, Kendra's Law and the Rights of the Mentally Ill: An Empirical
Peek Behind the Courts' Legal Analysis and a Suggested Template for the New York State
Legislature's Reconsideration for Renewal in 2010, 19 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 213, 221
(2009); Jennifer Gutterman, Waging a War on Drugs: Administering a Lethal Dose to
Kendra's Law, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2401, 2402 (2000).
103

Div. of Budget Rep. on Bills, B. Jacket, N.Y. Laws 1999, ch. 408, at 15 (1999).

104

N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60(c) (Consol. 2012).

105

N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60(e)(1)(i), (ii).

106

N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60(e)(1)(vii), (viii).

107

N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60(e)(2).

108

In re Miguel M., 882 N.Y.S.2d 698, 700 (App. Div. 2009); In re Barron v. M.M., 852
N.Y.S.2d 696, 697 (Sup. Ct. 2007).
109

Miguel M., 882 N.Y.S2d at 700; Barron, 852 N.Y.S.2d at 697.
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As the Director of AOT, Dr. Garza’s duties included investigating and evaluating
referrals to the Elmhurst AOT program.110 Dr. Garza testified that based on his
evaluation of Miguel M. and a review of Miguel M.’s clinical records from Elmhurst
and Holliswood Hospital, he diagnosed Miguel M. with schizoaffective disorder.
His office had received the records after requesting them from the hospitals.111 It
was uncontested that the records contained protected health information.112 It was
also uncontested that Dr. Garza “was not the director of medical records for either of
the hospitals, never obtained Miguel M.’s authorization to obtain the clinical records,
and had not obtained a court order permitting him to obtain the clinical records.”113
During Dr. Garza’s testimony petitioner sought to introduce the medical records into
evidence.114 Thereafter, Miguel M.’s attorney made a motion to preclude the clinical
records and Dr. Garza’s testimony regarding them as the records had been obtained
in violation of the HIPAA Privacy Rule.115
After receiving briefs on the issue, the trial court denied the motion.116 While the
court declined to find that the release of records was proper under 45 C.F.R. §
164.512(a)(1), which permits disclosure of medical records where disclosure is
required by law, the court found disclosure was proper under 45 C.F.R. §
164.512(b)(1)(i).117 That section of the Privacy Rule permits disclosure “to a public
health authority that is authorized by law to collect or receive such information for
the purposes of preventing or controlling disease, . . . and the conduct of public
health surveillance, public health investigations, and public health interventions.”118
The court found that Dr. Garza qualified as “a public health authority” and that the
AOT program qualified as a “public health intervention” and “public health
investigation.”119 Because the court found that the disclosures were authorized under
HIPAA, it deemed the records admissible and relied heavily upon them in its
judgment directing Miguel M. to receive and accept AOT for a period of six
months.120
C. Second Department Decision
On appeal, the Second Department of the New York State Supreme Court,
Appellate Division reached the same conclusion.121 HIPAA defines “public health
110

Miguel M., 882 N.Y.S2d at 700.

111

Id.; Barron, 852 N.Y.S.2d at 697.

112

Miguel M., 882 N.Y.S2d at 700.

113

Id. at 700-01.

114

Id. at 700.

115

Miguel M., 882 N.Y.S.2d at 700.

116

Id. at 701.

117

Barron, 852 N.Y.S.2d at 700.

118

45 C.F.R. § 164.512(b)(1)(i) (2012).

119

Miguel M., 882 N.Y.S.2d at 702; Barron, 852 N.Y.S.2d at 700.

120

Miguel M., 882 N.Y.S.2d at 702.

121

Id. at 704-05.
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authority” as “an agency or authority of the United States, a State, a territory, a
political subdivision . . . or a person or entity acting under a grant of authority from
or contract with such public agency, including the employees or agents of such
public entity . . . that is responsible for public health matters as part of its official
mandate”.122 The court reasoned that Dr. Garza qualified as a public health authority
because his duties as the director of AOT included investigating and evaluating
referrals to the AOT program.123 Such investigation was provided for in Kendra’s
Law, which specifically authorized the director of AOT to obtain the medical records
as part of its investigations.124 Citing the fact that the purpose of Kendra’s Law is to
protect the public from persons with mental illness who pose a potential risk to
public health and safety, the court reasoned that the AOT investigation qualified as a
“public health investigation” and “public health intervention” under HIPAA.125
Accordingly, the disclosure of Miguel M.’s medical records to Dr. Garza was
authorized by HIPAA and suppression was not warranted.126
The Second Department went on to note that even if the disclosures were not
authorized by HIPAA, HIPAA did not preempt Kendra’s Law with respect to AOT
investigations.127
HIPAA’s preemption provision specifically exempts
circumstances in which “[t]he provision of State law, including State procedures
established under such law, as applicable, provides for the reporting of disease or
injury… or for the conduct of public health surveillance, investigation, or
intervention”.128 Because HIPAA only preempts state law which is contrary to the
Privacy Rule and the court had found that AOT investigations qualify as “public
health investigations” or “public health interventions,” it found that Kendra’s Law
was not preempted and AOT investigations were excepted from HIPAA’s Privacy
Rule.129
D. Court of Appeals Decision
Before the Court of Appeals, Miguel M. again argued that Dr. Barron’s request
for his medical records was too broad and should have been on notice.130 The
records could have been obtained in a manner which complied with HIPAA (for
example by seeking a court order or subpoena), but Dr. Barron did not bother to
attempt any of them.131 This HIPAA violation should result in the suppression of the
medical records because it would be unreasonable to allow a party to place the other

122

45 C.F.R. § 164.501.

123

Miguel M., 882 N.Y.S.2d at 703-04.

124

Id. at 704.

125

Id. at 704-05.

126

Id. at 705.

127

Id. at 705-06.

128

45 C.F.R. § 160.203(c).

129

Miguel M., 882 N.Y.S.2d at 706.

130

In re Miguel M., 950 N.E.2d 107 (N.Y. 2011).

131

Id.
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party’s condition at issue and then seek to prove its prima facie case solely on the
basis of improperly obtained records.132
In response, Dr. Barron argued that the request for Miguel M.’s records was
made pursuant to the Mental Health Law, which authorizes disclosure when a
referral has been made to the AOT program.133 Dr. Barron contended that the AOT
program is a public health activity, designed to protect the public from violent
individuals, in the aggregate; in enacting Kendra’s Law the New York legislature
found that there was a public problem with mentally ill individuals supervising their
own medical care.134 Kendra’s Law was meant to make the treatment process more
open, with greater communications between health facilities and the Department of
Health.135 A requirement that AOT directors comply with HIPAA disclosure
regulations would be unduly burdensome and result in fewer proceedings being
brought.136 This would result in individuals not receiving needed treatment and
possibly harming others.137
Upon review, the Court of Appeals found that it was a stretch to read the
language of the “public health” exception in the Privacy Rule to include AOT
investigations.138 Looking to the intent behind the exception, the Court noted that its
apparent purpose “is to facilitate government activities that protect large numbers of
people from epidemics, environmental hazards, and the like, or that advance public
health by accumulating valuable statistical information.”139 AOT investigations are
not this type of activity.140 Thus, the Court ruled that AOT investigations were not
within the scope of the exception, stating, “[t]o disclose private information about
particular people, for the purpose of preventing those people from harming
themselves or others, effects a very substantial invasion of privacy without the sort
of generalized public benefit that would come from, for example, tracing the course
of an infectious disease.”141 This conclusion, the Court reasoned, is bolstered by the
fact that Dr. Barron could have invoked the provisions of the Privacy Rule
permitting disclosure in response to an order from a court or administrative tribunal
or a subpoena, discovery request, or other lawful process, all of which would have
provided Miguel M. with notice and an opportunity to object.142
After it determined that the Privacy Rule applied and that Dr. Barron had
violated it, the Court then had to decide what impact it had on the admissibility of
132
Oral Argument at 00:01-03:10, In re Miguel M., 950 N.E.2d 107 (No. 76), available at
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/CTAPPS/arguments/2011/Mar11/Mar11_OA.htm.
133

Id. at 08:51.

134

Id. at 11:04.

135

Id. at 17:57.

136

Id. at 17:00.

137

Id. at 17:37.

138

In re Miguel M,, 950 N.E.2d 107, 111 (N.Y. 2011).

139

Id.

140

Id.

141

Id.

142

Id. (citing 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.512(e)(1)(i), (ii)).
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the evidence.143 Dr. Barron argued that even if the disclosure was unlawful,
suppression was inappropriate as HIPAA contains its own remedies for violations:
civil penalties and, for the knowing and wrongful disclosure of covered information,
fines and imprisonment.144 Dr. Barron cited state court decisions from Florida,145
Kansas,146 and Wisconsin147 in support of his argument.148 In response, Miguel M.
maintained that the remedies under HIPAA are limited to filing a complaint with the
Secretary and thus are insufficient to address his situation.149 While other states have
found suppression inapplicable to evidence obtained in violation of HIPAA, those
cases are distinguishable in that they were all criminal cases where disclosure was
made to law enforcement officials.150 Thus, Miguel M. argued, the Court should
follow Keshecki151 and Matter of Derek152 which both found suppression to be an
appropriate remedy in civil cases.153
The Court agreed with Miguel M.154 It noted that, as was the case with violations
of the doctor-patient privilege, in criminal cases a violation of HIPAA or the Privacy
Rule does not always require the suppression of evidence.155 However, the Court
continued,
this case is different. It is one thing to allow the use of evidence resulting
from improper disclosure of information in medical records to prove that
a patient has committed a crime; it is another to use the records
themselves, or their contents, in a proceeding to subject to unwanted
medical treatment a patient who is accused of no wrongdoing. Using the
records in that way directly impairs, without adequate justification, the

143

Id. at 112.

144

Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d-5, 1320d-6).

145

State v. Carter, 23 So. 3d 798, 801 (Fla Dist. Ct. App. 2009).

146

State v. Yenzer, 195 P.3d 271, 273 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008).

147

State v. Straehler, 2008 WI App 14, ¶ 13, 745 N.W.2d 431, 435 (Ct. App. 2007).

148

Miguel M., 950 N.E.2d at 112; see also Oral Argument, supra note 132.

149

Oral Argument, supra note 132.

150

Id.

151

Keshecki v. St. Vincent’s Med. Ctr., 785 N.Y.S.2d 300 (Sup. Ct. 2004).

152

Matter of Derek, 821 N.Y.S.2d 387 (Sur. Ct. 2006).

153

While in oral argument Miguel M.’s counsel stated “we have at least three trial court
decisions that all hold in the context of civil litigation … that records obtained in violation of
HIPAA should be precluded,” he does not give any citations for those cases. Scott M. Wells,
Representative for Appellant, Oral Argument (Mar. 23, 2011). His brief only cites Keshecki
and Matter of Derek in support of this position. Telephone Interview with Susan Dautal,
Assistant Deputy Clerk, N.Y. Court of Appeals (Sept. 2, 2011).
154

In re Miguel M,, 950 N.E.2d 107, 112 (N.Y. 2011).

155

Id. (citing People v. Greene, 879 N.E.2d 1280 (N.Y. 2007)).
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interest protected by HIPAA and the Privacy Rule: the interest in keeping
one’s own medical condition private.156
Thus, the Court ruled that medical evidence obtained in violation of HIPAA is
“not admissible in a proceeding to compel AOT.”157
III. ANALYSIS
Overall, the Court’s decision appears to be guided by the underlying assumption
that Dr. Barron could have easily obtained Miguel M.’s medical records in
compliance with HIPAA by issuing a subpoena. The decision stressed that “it is far
from our purpose to make enforcement of Kendra’s Law difficult,” but that Dr.
Barron could have issued a subpoena, and that it would be “no great burden on the
public agencies charged with enforcing Kendra’s Law to give patients a chance to
object before records are delivered.”158 Notably, the first question during oral
argument, asked by Justice Read within the first 35 seconds, was, “assuming we
agree with you, are there other ways that the information can be obtained?”159
Miguel M. responded that Dr. Barron could have obtained a court order or issued a
subpoena.160 He later noted that issuing a subpoena for the records “wouldn’t be too
hard.”161 When Justice Smith asked if it would be necessary to bring a proceeding to
obtain a subpoena, Miguel M. responded “no, I think they could issue a subpoena for
these records under their authority under the Mental Hygiene Law.”162 Justice Read
later pressed Dr. Barron on this point, asking “What’s wrong with the other methods,
how are they burdensome, or if anything, a subpoena, is it that difficult?”163 When
Dr. Barron started to respond that obtaining a court order would be burdensome,
Justice Smith interjected, “They don’t say you have to get a court order, they say a
subpoena would do. . . as I read it, if you issue a subpoena and give him notice he
can move to quash the subpoena, but then it becomes his problem, why don’t you
want to do that?”164 Oddly, Dr. Barron never disputed that it could easily issue a
subpoena, which is not provided for in the Mental Hygiene Law.
However, the authority to issue subpoenas is granted under section 2302 of the
CPLR.165 Subsection a of CPLR 2302 states that “a subpoena to compel production
of a patient’s clinical record maintained pursuant to the provisions of section 33.13
of the mental hygiene law shall be accompanied by a court order.”166 Moreover,
156
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Id. at 112.
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Oral Argument, supra note 132, at 00:34.
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Oral Argument, supra note 132, at 14:26.
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Oral Argument, supra note 132 at 15:06-15:15.
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N.Y. C.P.L.R. 2302 (Consol. 2012).
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N.Y. C.P.L.R. 2302(a) (Consol. 2012).

20

JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH

[Vol. 26:1

CPLR 2302(b) states that “In the absence of an authorization by a patient, a trial
subpoena duces tecum for the patient's medical records may only be issued by a
court.”167 Likewise section 3122(a) of the CPLR states that a medical provider need
not respond to a subpoena unless it is accompanied by a HIPAA authorization.168
When the references to HIPAA requirements were added to these sections in 2003,
there was no differentiation between subpoenas issued by a court and subpoenas
issued by attorneys. Accordingly, in Campos v. Payne, a Richmond County judge
ruled that he was without authority to issue subpoenas for medical records without
the patient’s signed authorization.169 Nonetheless, it was not the New York
Legislature’s intention “that the requirement for such an authorization apply to trial
subpoenas.”170 Accordingly, the Legislature recently passed an amendment to
sections 2302 and 3122 of the CPLR to clarify their intentions.171 The newly
amended versions, enacted August 3, 2011, specify that HIPAA compliant
authorizations need to accompany subpoenas other than trail subpoenas issued by a
court.172 Thus, in the absence of a HIPAA authorization, Dr. Barron cannot simply
subpoena Miguel M.’s medical records, as Miguel M. and the Justices suggested.
Moreover, at the time the Court of Appeals issued Miguel M., he could not have
even obtained a court ordered subpoena without a HIPAA authorization.173 In order
167

N.Y. C.P.L.R. 2302(b); see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3122(a) (Consol. 2012).

168

N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3122(a)(2).

169

Campos v. Payne, 766 N.Y.S.2d 535, 539 (Sup. Ct. 2003).

170

Sponsor’s Mem. In Support of B. S4586A (2011), available at http://open.nysenate.
gov/legislation/bill/S4586A-2011.
171
172

Id.
The amended version of N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3122(a)(2) states:

A medical provider served with a subpoena duces tecum, other than a trial subpoena
issued by a court, requesting the production of a patient’s medical records pursuant to
this rule need not respond or object to the subpoena if the subpoena is not
accompanied by a written authorization by the patient. Any subpoena served upon a
medical provider requesting the medical records of a patient shall state in conspicuous
bold-faced type that the records shall not be provided unless the subpoena is
accompanied by a written authorization by the patient, or the court has issued the
subpoena otherwise directed the production of the documents.
Assemb. B. A7465-A, State Assemb., 2011 Sess. (N.Y. 2011); S.B. 4586-A, State S., 2011
Sess. (N.Y. 2011), available at http://public.leginfo.state.ny.us/menugetf.cgi; see also N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 2302(b) (Consol. 2012) (“In the absence of an authorization by a patient, a trial
subpoena duces tecum for the patient's medical records may only be issued by a court.”).
173
Notably, the New York State Legislature has recently expressed its displeasure at the
Court’s failure to follow Article 31 of the CPLR. On June 14, 2011, the Assembly passed the
Personal Healthcare Information Privacy Act, stating that “In its decision of Arons v.
Jutkowitz 9 NY 3d 393 (2007) the Court of Appeals ignored the rules of Article 31 and by
judicial fiat created a new rule. This bill would correct that ill-advised decision.” Sponsor’s
Mem., Assemb. B. 694A, available at http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/. The Act, which has
not yet been passed by the Senate, would add a subsection c-1 to CPLR 3102 prohibiting ex
parte interviews with healthcare providers of any other party in a personal injury, malpractice,
or wrongful death action. Assemb. B. A694, State Assemb., 2011 Sess. (N.Y. 2011),
available at http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/.
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to comply with CPLR 2302, Dr. Barron would have had to obtain a court order
directing Miguel M. to provide the HIPAA authorization for his medical records to
accompany the subpoena (though arguably there would be no use for the subpoena
once the authorization was obtained). The emphasis the Court placed on the
availability of an unburdensome, alternative method for obtaining medical records
during oral argument and in its decision suggests that it may have reached a different
outcome on the suppression issue if the provisions of CPLR 2302 had been brought
to its attention.
In terms of the suppression issue, at first glance, Miguel M. seems inconsistent
with existing jurisprudence. Unfortunately, the decision contains little analysis to
explain the Court’s determination of the issue and no citations in support of its
decision to suppress.174 This is likely due to the fact that when the Court ruled on
the issue, neither the trial court nor the appellate division had addressed it; both
lower courts found no violation of HIPAA, and accordingly it was not vigorously
briefed and argued by the parties on appeal.175 However, by considering the facts of
the case the jurisprudence can be harmonized.
One of the most important facts in Miguel M. is that the medical evidence
unlawfully obtained consisted of psychiatric records. In this sense, its outcome is
consistent with prevailing notions that mental health records are extremely sensitive
and deserving of protection. As found in O’Connor, “information about a person’s
psychiatric health and substance-abuse history in particular, is information of the
most intimate kind.”176 Likewise, the United States Supreme Court recognized the
unique nature of this information by creating a psychotherapist privilege in Jaffee v.
Redmond.177 Notably, the Privacy Rule treats psychotherapy notes with “heightened
protection” above that provided to regular PHI.178 The Secretary explained, “we have
provided additional protections for psychotherapy notes because of Jaffee v.
Redmond and the unique role of this type of information.”179 Thus, disclosure
without a patient authorization is only permitted to the originator of the
psychotherapy note for purposes of treatment; for the covered entity’s use for its
own training programs; for the covered entity’s use in defending against a legal
action brought by the individual; when required by law; for health oversight
activities with respect to the oversight of the note’s originator; to a coroner or
medical examiner for the purpose of identifying the deceased individual or
174

In re Miguel M., 950 N.E.2d 107, 112 (N.Y. 2011).

175

In re Miguel M., 882 N.Y.S.2d 698 (App. Div. 2009); Oral Argument, supra note 132.

176

O’Connor v. Pierson, 426 F.3d 187, 201(2d Cir. 2005); see also Martin v. Martelli, 554
N.Y.S.2d 787, 788 (Sup. Ct. 1990) (“While exposure of medical records may reveal highly
sensitive and personal information about an individual, the potential depth of privacy violation
is far greater in the case of mental health records.”); In re State (Off. of Mental Health
Buffalo Psychiatric Ctr.) v. Civil Serv. Emp. Assoc., 430 N.Y.S.2d 510, 513 (Sup. Ct. 1980)
(stating that a mental health record “is of such a highly personal nature that it should be
embraced within that special area of protected privacy”).
177

Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1996).

178

Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg.
82462, 82731 (Dec. 28, 2000).
179
Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. at
82652.
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determining a cause of death; and when it is necessary to prevent or lessen a serious
and imminent threat to health or safety of a person or the public.180 The exceptions
permitting disclosure without authorization for judicial and administrative
proceedings do not apply.181 Considering the jurisprudence suggesting that there is a
constitutional right to privacy in one’s mental health records,182 In re Miguel M. can
be harmonized with the rule that evidence will only be suppressed where there are
constitutional considerations or statutory or decisional authority mandating
suppression.183
Another important fact in Miguel M is the relationship between the party
introducing the unlawfully obtained medical records and the office from which the
records were obtained. Again, here the outcome is consistent with the Court’s prior
statements on the role of suppression. In People v. Drain, the Court explained:
The exclusionary rule’s primary function is deterrence of future unlawful
police activity; the rule has never been viewed as a ‘personal remedial
right of a party aggrieved’ by the misconduct. This court has long
recognized, therefore, that the application and scope of the exclusionary
rule is ascertained by balancing the foreseeable deterrent effect against the
adverse impact of suppression upon the truth-finding process.
Consequently, we consistently have refused to suppress relevant evidence
if little or no deterrent benefit could be anticipated from the exclusion.184
Likewise, in People v. Greene, the Court declined to suppress evidence obtained
in violation of CPLR 4505, stating “The primary obligation to comply with CPLR
4504 is the doctor’s--or, in this case, the hospital’s. To suppress evidence resulting
from a violation of section 4504 would be to punish the State for a doctor’s or
hospital's misconduct--a punishment unlikely to deter doctors and hospitals, who
have little interest in whether criminal prosecutions succeed or not.”185
As noted above, the petition in Miguel M. was brought by Dr. Barron, in his role
as the Director of the Department of Psychiatry at Elmhurst Hospital Center.186 The
180

45 C.F.R. § 164.508(c)(2) (2012).

181

Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg.
82462, 82653 (Dec. 28, 2000).
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See O’Connor v. Pierson, 426 F.3d 187, 202 (2d Cir. 2005).
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People v. Greene, 879 N.E.2d 1280, 1282-83 (N.Y. 2007); People v. Wilder, 712
N.E.2d 652, 654 (N.Y. 1999); Mosallem v. Berenson, 905 N.Y.S.2d 575, 581 (App. Div.
2010); Radder v. CSX Transp., Inc., 893 N.Y.S.2d 725, 727 (App. Div. 2009).
184

People v. Drain, 535 N.E.2d 630, 631 (N.Y. 1989) (citations omitted); see also Boyd v.
Constantine, 613 N.E.2d 511, 514 (N.Y. 1993) (permitting the use of illegally obtained
evidence in a police disciplinary hearing as “only negligible deterrence would result from the
exclusion of evidence.”).
185

Greene, 879 N.E.2d at 1283; see also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 466 (1976) (“[The
exclusionary rule] is not calculated to redress the injury to the privacy of the victim of the
search or seizure, for any ‘[r]eparation comes too late.’ Instead, ‘the rule is a judicially
created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its
deterrent effect….’”) (quoting Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965); United States
v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)).
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In re Miguel M., 950 N.E.2d 107, 109 (N.Y. 2011).
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evidence had been obtained from both Elmhurst and Holliswood Hospital in
violation of HIPAA by Dr. Garza, the Director of AOT at Elmhurst.187 While the
decisions do not reveal who released the information, the Elmhurst records had to
have been released by an employee because the records were in Elmhurst Hospital’s
custody.188 As Director of the Department of Psychiatry, Dr. Barron can presumably
influence the policies and management of patient records within the Department of
Psychiatry. Accordingly, suppressing Dr. Barron’s evidence based on his hospital’s
failure to comply with HIPAA is likely to deter the hospital from similar violations
in the future.
Because most AOT proceedings will be brought by health professionals and all
will involve a patient’s mental health record,189 it is not surprising that in Miguel M.,
the Court announced that medical records obtained in violation of HIPAA “are not
admissible in a proceeding to compel AOT.”190 However, the Court did not hold that
records obtained in violation of HIPAA are always inadmissible. Notably, its
decision is void of any broad statements or dicta which could support suppression in
other types of cases. In keeping with the frequently quoted rule that “[t]he language
of any opinion must be confined to the facts before the court,”191 in terms of creating
a new rule of evidence, Miguel M. should be narrowly interpreted as applying solely
to AOT proceedings.
Though Miguel M. may not state a firm rule of evidence for cases outside of
AOT proceedings, it does provide some guidance on how HIPAA violations should
be treated. Its reasoning as to why suppression was appropriate suggests that the
justification for the HIPAA violation would be considered in ruling on suppression
motions. By stating that suppression may not be required in criminal cases, the
Court also indicated that the type of proceeding would influence whether evidence
was admitted or suppressed.
A. Criminal Trials
In the context of criminal trials, Miguel M. indicates that it is unlikely a violation
of the Privacy Rule will lead to suppression of medical evidence. After noting the
cases referenced by Dr. Barron (State v. Carter,192 State v. Yenzer,193 and State v.
Straehler194), the Court stated “[w]e assume it is correct that, in a criminal case, a
HIPAA Privacy Rule violation does not always require suppression of evidence.
Indeed we have held that suppression is not required in such a case where evidence
187

Miguel M., 882 N,Y.S.2d 698, 700 (App. Div. 2009).
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N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 33.13(a) (Consol. 2012).
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See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60(c),(e) (Consol. 2012).
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Miguel M., 950 N.E.2d at 112.
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Dougherty v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y., 193 N.E. 897, 902 (N.Y. 1934); see also
People v. Anderson, 488 N.E.2d 1231, 1235 (N.Y. 1985); Staber v. Fidler, 482 N.E.2d 1204,
1206 (N.Y. 1985); Banc of Am. Sec. LLC v. Solow Bldg. Co,. 847 N.Y.S.2d 49, 55 (App.
Div. 2007); Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n. v. Urbach, 718 N.Y.S.2d 282, 285 (App.
Div. 2000).
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State v. Carter, 23 So. 3d 798 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009).

193

State v. Yenzer, 195 P.3d 271 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008).
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State v. Straehler, 2008 WI App. 14, 745 N.W.2d 431 (2007).
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was obtained as a result of a violation of New York’s physician-patient privilege.”195
With this language, the Court implicitly approved the analyses in those out-of-state
criminal cases.
The out-of-state decisions referenced in Miguel M. relied on the fact that HIPAA
provided its own remedies to find that suppression of evidence obtained in violation
of HIPAA was not appropriate. In Carter a pharmacist revealed prescription records
to an officer investigating a “doctor shopping violation” without obtaining the
defendant’s consent. 196 The defendant was then charged with the crime of doctor
shopping.197 In Yenzer, a receptionist revealed a patient’s dental appointment
records to a police officer who was attempting to serve a warrant. When the officer
attempted service on the defendant at the appointment, the defendant ran, leading to
charges of obstructing legal process.198 In Straehler, a nurse revealed observations
about the defendant and the defendant’s statements (made during the course of
treatment) to a police officer who was investigating a car crash. This led to driving
while intoxicated charges against the defendant.199 Each case noted that the
defendant’s constitutional rights were not at issue.200 Reciting the basic rule that
suppression is only warranted where evidence has been obtained in violation of a
defendant’s constitutional rights or where the statute specifically provides for
suppression as a remedy, each court found it was not proper to suppress the
evidence.201
Notably, none of these decisions concerned the type of medical information that
the Second Circuit has deemed protected by a constitutional right to privacy (i.e.
mental health records, HIV diagnoses, and substance abuse records).202 While the
New York Court of Appeals is likely to follow the reasoning in Carter, Yenzer and
Straehler in most criminal cases, where more sensitive medical information is
involved there is justification for its analysis to diverge. Notably, the Court of
Appeals used tentative language in Miguel M. when distinguishing it from criminal
cases.203 However, as the HIPAA Privacy Rule was not designed to protect a
constitutional right to privacy, it is more appropriate to attribute suppression in cases
involving sensitive medical information to constitutional violations than it is to
justify the suppression with reference to HIPAA.
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B. Civil Trials
In the context of civil trials, Miguel M. suggests that the justification for the
procurement of the medical evidence at issue is an important consideration. In its
decision, the Court expressed its unease at the prospect of parties using unlawfully
obtained medical evidence as a basis for bringing a civil action.204 Accordingly,
Miguel M. suggests that where that is the case the medical evidence obtained in
violation of HIPAA will be suppressed, even outside the context of an AOT
proceeding.
However, it is likely the Court of Appeals would find suppression of relevant
medical evidence inappropriate in certain circumstances. It has long been held that
“notwithstanding New York’s strong policy in favor of the [physician-patient]
privilege, a party should not be permitted to affirmatively assert a medical condition
in seeking damages or in defending against liability while simultaneously relying on
the confidential physician-patient relationship as a sword to thwart the opposition in
its efforts to uncover facts critical to disputing the party’s claim.”205 Thus, the Court
of Appeals has found that where an individual affirmatively places privileged
information or conduct at issue, statutory and constitutional rights and privileges are
deemed waived.206
The drafters of the HIPAA Privacy Rule specifically endorsed this
approach, stating:
[its provisions] are not intended to disrupt current practice whereby an
individual who is a party to a proceeding and has put his or her medical
condition at issue will not prevail without consenting to the production of
his or her protected health information. In such cases, we presume that
parties will have ample notice and an opportunity to object in the context
of the proceeding in which the individual is a party.207
Accordingly, at least one New York supreme court has found that by
affirmatively raising a party’s own mental or physical condition in a personal injury
action, that party waives any rights or remedies under HIPAA as to the mental or
physical conditions asserted in the litigation.208 The court stated that in such cases,
“the waiver of any HIPAA rights . . . has the practical effect of assuring [the other
party] that the state court will not impose any remedy for a purported violation of
HIPAA, i.e. the type of preclusion that occurred in Keshecki.”209 As placing one’s
own medical condition at issue in a civil case is seemingly the antithesis of the
204
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Dillenbeck v. Hess, 536 N.E.2d 1126, 1132 (N.Y. 1989); see also Clifford v. Denver &
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situation in Miguel M. (where the medical records were obtained to bring the suit), it
is unlikely the Court of Appeals would have the same aversion to admitting medical
records when that scenario arises.
C. Administrative Hearings
In re Miguel M. can also provide guidance for administrative hearings, which
arise out of similar circumstances—an agency bringing an action to enforce its
legislative mandate. Though usually civil in nature, administrative proceedings have
broader rules of evidence.210 The New York State Administrative Procedure Act
(“APA”) specifies that “[u]nless otherwise provided by any statute, agencies need
not observe the rules of evidence observed by courts”.211 Likewise, the APA
empowers agencies to adopt their own rules of procedure for adjudicatory
proceedings.212 Moreover, the APA empowers agencies to adopt their own rules for
discovery to the extent and in the manner appropriate for their proceedings.213 And
agencies are not required to adopt the rules governing discovery sanctions in the
CPLR, and without having done so are not bound by them.214 Thus, in
administrative proceedings parties can rely on evidence that might not be admissible
under the ordinary rules of evidence.215 Significantly, without the application of
section 3103 of the CPLR, it is more likely that evidence obtained in violation of
HIPAA will be admitted.
The Court of Appeals has looked to the deterrence function of suppression in
deciding whether unlawfully obtained evidence is required to be suppressed in
administrative hearings.216 For example, in Boyd v. Constantine, where city police
had uncovered drugs in an unlawful search, that Court found that those drugs were
admissible in the disciplinary hearing of a state police officer. Citing the deterrence
analysis in Drain,217 the Court stated:
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William H. Kuehnle, Standards of Evidence in Administrative Proceedings, 49 N.Y.L.
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N.E.2d 541, 550-01 (N.Y. 1978); see also Charles Q. v. Constantine, 612 N.Y.S.2d 687, 68889 (App. Div. 1994) (“in an administrative proceeding, suppression of illegally obtained
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The Buffalo City Police could not have foreseen, when they searched the
vehicle, that defendant would be subject to an administrative disciplinary
proceeding by the Division of State Police. They did not know, prior to
the search, that defendant was a State Trooper. Nor were the Buffalo City
police officers acting as agents of the Division of State Police. Thus, only
negligible deterrence would result from the exclusion of the evidence. On
the other hand, the suppression of the evidence would have a significant
adverse impact upon the truth-finding process in administrative
proceedings concerning police officers involved in drug-related incidents.
Stated differently, the benefit to be gained from precluding police
officers, who unlawfully possess controlled substances, from making
arrests--including arrests for drug-related offenses--clearly outweighs any
deterrent effect that may arise from applying the exclusionary rule to
preclude evidence unlawfully obtained by Buffalo City police officers and
sought to be admitted by the Division of State Police in an administrative
disciplinary proceeding.218
Central to its analysis on why suppression would have little deterrence effect was
the fact that the party seeking to introduce the unlawfully obtained evidence was not
an agent of the party that unlawfully obtained it.219 In re Miguel M. further supports
this approach by providing an example of the opposite situation: where the party
seeking to introduce the unlawfully obtained evidence worked for, and indeed was
head of the Department that unlawfully produced it, the Court found suppression to
be appropriate.220 Thus, the potential deterrent effect of suppression should continue
to be a factor considered in determining if evidence obtained in violation of HIPAA
is admissible in an administrative proceeding.
Whether or not a party has placed his or her medical condition at issue should
also be a consideration in determining admissibility in administrative hearings. Like
the supreme courts, agencies took this position prior to In re Miguel M. For
example, in Department of Environmental Protection v. Rodriguez, an administrative
law judge at the New York City Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings found
that a letter from an employee’s doctor was admissible in the employee’s
disciplinary hearing.221 The judge stated that “by submitting medical notes and
claiming that he was sick on the dates in question, respondent implicitly waived his
right to confidentiality.”222 As discussed above with respect to civil proceedings, this
approach should continue in administrative proceedings as well.
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IV. CONCLUSION
As the first Court of Appeals decision on the issue, In re Miguel M. is bound to
be considered in future cases addressing whether or not it is appropriate to admit
evidence obtained in violation of HIPAA. Like the limited statutory and
constitutional authority supporting suppression when HIPAA violations occur,
Miguel M. should be viewed as narrow decisional authority, limited to AOT
hearings. With respect to other proceedings, however, Miguel M. should not be
used as a new evidentiary rule, justifying suppression of all evidence obtained in
violation of HIPAA. Instead, Miguel M. should stand for the proposition that the
type and circumstances of a case need to be carefully considered in determining if
suppression is appropriate. Special attention should be paid to the type of medical
evidence at issue, the identity of the parties, and the reason for the introduction of the
evidence. In this manner In re Miguel M. can be harmonized with existing
jurisprudence and be used to provide more equitable outcomes for litigants.

